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Trajectories of State Formation in Eurasia: 
A Discussion 
Antonio Luigi Paolilli & Fabio Pollice  
Abstract: »Trajektorien der Staatsbildung in Eurasia: eine Diskussion«. Two 
questions have often been posed: 1) Why did humanity not take the path of 
Modernity already in Ancient times? 2) Why was it Europe that undertook the 
development towards Modernity? In this paper we will present an overview of 
these issues, trying to outline an interpretative hypothesis about the propulsive 
role that the presence, after the fall of the Roman Empire, of a plurality of po-
litical entities in a constant relation of competition and cooperation, had on the 
development of the European continent. At the same time we will analyze the 
evolutionary dynamics that pushed Europe, rather than China, India or the 
Arab world, towards Modernity. 
Keywords: ancient history, state formation, Eurasia, cliometrics. 
1. Introduction 
A question that has often been posed is why did humanity not take the path of 
Modernity already in Ancient times. The question has relevance for Europe in 
particular, especially given the fact that in this region there was the highly 
developed Roman Empire, whose grandeur and opulence may make the subse-
quent decadence and fall seem inexplicable. 
Another question, however, seems inevitable: why was it Europe that under-
took the development towards Modernity1? Other regions of Eurasia had 
achieved remarkable levels of technology, often higher than in Europe, particu-
larly in the Middle Ages, but without experiencing the revolution in the social 
and productive system that above all from the end of the eighteenth century 
characterized the history of the West, a revolution whose premises were al-
ready found in the Commercial Revolution of the Late Middle Ages. 
One of the possible explanations is that the geo-political situation of Europe, 
after the fall of the Roman empire, was characterized by an extreme fragmenta-
tion and instability. 
In this paper we will present an overview of these issues, trying to outline an 
interpretative hypothesis about the propulsive role that the presence, after the 
                                                             
  Address all communications to: Antonio Luigi Paolilli, University of Salento, via Francesco 
Baracca 105, 73024 Maglie (LE), Italy; e-mail: antonio.paolilli@unisalento.it. 
Fabio Pollice, University of Salento, via Francesco Baracca 105, 73024 Maglie (LE), Italy;  
e-mail: Fabio.pollice@unina.it. 
1  See Vincent, 2002 [1995], p. 81. 
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fall of the Roman Empire, of a plurality of political entities in a constant rela-
tion of competition and cooperation, had on the development of the European 
continent. At the same time we will analyze the evolutionary dynamics that 
pushed Europe, rather than China, India or the Arab world, towards Modernity. 
2. East and West Eurasian Societies: A General Discussion 
The comparison between the Eurasian societies has been studied not only by 
historians, but also by geographers. Among the works of historians, we must 
mention the research of Scheidel (2007), concerning the comparison between 
Chinese and European civilities (see also Cosandey, 1997; Lang, 1997; Pomer-
anz, 2000). This research poses in particular the question of why the history of 
the two regions showed a convergence until the sixth century A.D., followed 
by a remarkable divergence. 
In the geographical field a similar problem has been posed by Diamond 
(1997), who analyzed the development of civilization, following the agricul-
tural revolution, in various regions of the world, including China, India and the 
Mediterranean. 
About the comparison between the Chinese civilization and that of Western 
Eurasia, Scheidel examines the proximate and the ultimate causes of the con-
vergence in Ancient times and the later divergence between the two civilities. 
As regards proximate causes, Scheidel uses Wickham’s interpretative model 
(Wickham, 2005), noting above all that in the context of fiscal decline and 
decentralization of political and military power of West Eurasia, much more 
intense than in China, “it became harder to maintain state capabilities (espe-
cially in the military sphere), economic activity was curtailed, and the pros-
pects for the restoration of a stable core-wide empire were poor” (Scheidel, 
2007, p.3). 
If it is true, however, that the final completion of this process of transforma-
tion from an economy with a relatively high intensity of trade and a strong 
centralized state to one with the opposite characteristics was achieved by the 
Islamic invasion. It is also true that it had begun centuries before, with the 
decline of the Roman Empire. 
The causes of the decline of the Roman world have been widely investi-
gated. The argument, already raised by Gibbon (1776), has been addressed by 
Rostovcev (1926) and Walbank (1946), who posed the problem of why the 
economic system of the Roman Empire was unable to continue its growth to 
arrive at an industrial take-off. Among recent scholars, we must cite Ward-
Perkins (2005) who, opposing the thesis that the Empire underwent a transfor-
mation rather than a decline and a real fall, underline that the invasions of the 
Germanic tribes were for the Romans a traumatic event which undermined the 
economic and social structures of the invaded territories. The scholar discusses 
a series of events that contributed to Rome’s fall, such as the decline of the 
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Roman military machine, the civil war, and a sequence of ineffective emperors. 
A similar opinion is that of Heather (2007), who reviews many reasons which 
may justify the fall of the Roman Empire, constituted by a pernicious combina-
tion of external causes (principally the pressure of the Huns) and internal 
causes. 
On the other hand, Homer-Dixon (2006), who bases his analysis on the con-
frontation between economics and thermodynamics, believes in more endoge-
nous and deterministic causes. For Homer-Dixon the success of the empire 
depended on its ability to extract surpluses from the imperial territories and 
concentrate them at the centre, where they enabled the development of a very 
complex organization. As the state was growing, the reaching of an equilibrium 
between the flow of resources and the size of those necessary to conquer far-
flung territories was a turning point, from development to recession. 
An economic and social explanation of the reason the Roman economy did 
not develop towards Modernity has been furnished by Schiavone (2002 
[1996]), who asserts that this development was rendered impossible by the 
domination of the slave economy and the absence of a philosophy making 
productive labour worthy of consideration. 
More recently, Paolilli (2008), referring on the data presented by Parker 
(1992) and related to the shipwrecks occurring in the Mediterranean Sea in 
Ancient Times, strengthened the argument put forward by Hopkins (1981) 
who, although the shipwrecks seem to follow the profile of a normal curve, 
with its peak near the beginning of the Christian age, does not deduce that 
trading across the Mediterranean was more intense in the two centuries before 
the birth of Christ than in imperial times, attributing the greater number of 
shipwrecks in the former period to piracy, which was interrupted under Pom-
peus. The same data are in fact differently presented by Paolilli who shows that 
the real peak of the shipwrecks (and therefore, presumably, of trade), excluding 
the effect of piracy, came in the middle of the 2nd century A.D. Paolilli also 
considers the thesis of Duncan-Jones (1994) who, revealing a considerable 
degree of monetization of Roman society2, notes that the monetary circulation 
seems to have been local rather than Mediterranean, and this appears true 
above all for the centuries after the second century A.D. Lo Cascio (2003) 
provides an explanation of this phenomenon, suggesting that the transfer of 
money from the provinces to Rome and vice-versa happened only for the set-
tlements and that this, therefore, does not imply a scarcity of Mediterranean 
                                                             
2  The considerable degree of monetization of Roman society estimated by Duncan-Jones is 
confirmed, as cited also by Paolilli (2008), by the research into the composition of ice lay-
ers in Greenland and into lake basin sediments in Sweden, Switzerland and Spain (Hong, 
Candelone, Patterson, Boutron, 1994, 1996; Hong, Candelone, Soutif, Boutron, 1996; Ren-
berg, Persson, Enteryd, 1994; Shotyk, Weiss, Appleby, Cheburkin, Frei, Gloor, Kramers, 
Reese, van Der Knaap, 1998). 
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trade. As mentioned above, moreover, evidence of the localization of monetary 
circulation seems to exist precisely for the centuries following the end of the 
adoptive emperors’ dynasty. Following Lo Cascio (2003), who asserted that 
Italy, which enjoyed a flow of money from the provinces, experienced centu-
ries of higher prices compared to the provinces, to the progressive detriment of 
its internal production, wrong-footed by the competition from the provinces, 
Paolilli (2008) concludes that the political unity of the Mediterranean Sea was 
the outcome of a co-evolutionary phenomenon between the growth of Mediter-
ranean Sea trade and the forming of a single state along its coasts, and that the 
effective unity of this state was possible only as long as Italy remained its eco-
nomic (as well as geographical) centre. It must also be considered that the 
Roman economy was based on the army which, with the enlargement of the 
Empire, was more expensive but yielded less, and that the elites were consum-
ers of imported luxury goods, expensive for the Empire’s economy. The eco-
nomic decline of Italy, therefore, provoked the collapse of Mediterranean trade, 
rendering obsolete the political unity of the territories around it, as is attested 
by the evidence of the localization of monetary circulation in the Late Empire 
and the growth of local political experiences (Imperium Galliarum and Zenobia 
reign firstly, Tetrarchia later). Paolilli, however, also referring to the results of 
two mathematical models previously used (Paolilli, 2005a; 2005b), asserts that 
the collapse of Mediterranean trade led to a progressive economic de-
specialization, with a return to bartering, and a consequent implosion of pro-
duction. In this respect, the viewpoint of Paolilli is similar to the interpretative 
model cited above (Wickham, 2005), followed by Scheidel to investigate the 
proximate causes of the divergence between East and West Eurasia after the 
6th century. It must be pointed out, however, that Paolilli’s analysis is focused 
on long-term factors, albeit economic and social, due to the fact they are seen 
in a geographical context, making them more similar to the ultimate causes 
studied by Scheidel. 
Scheidel, in fact, holds that the proximate causes of the divergence are only 
the effects of deeper factors (the ultimate causes). Among these he distin-
guishes geographic, demographic and ideological factors and the nature of the 
earlier government institutions and the subsequent regimes. 
On geography, Scheidel notes that  
The absence of very large states from Europe (with the temporary exception 
of the Roman Empire) is a feature that constitutes an anomaly in the temperate 
zone that stretches east-west across Eurasia (Scheidel, 2007, p. 6). 
Moreover he admits that it was easier to maintain a single very large state in 
China, since that region is compact and shielded on three sides by mountains 
and ocean, but notes also that  
the presence of an inner sea core in the form of the Mediterranean Sea and of 
navigable rivers that crisscross its hinterlands might well be considered more 
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conducive to unity than the parallel river valleys that segment China and the 
historically marginal position of the Pacific Ocean (Scheidel, 2007, p. 6). 
In fact, as we have seen, this is what happened, at least during the Roman age. 
Also as regards the other ultimate causes, Scheidel believes that they may be 
decisive in explaining the divergence between East and West Eurasia, but he 
does not think that any one of them is the certain key factor. 
Finally Scheidel (2007, p. 12) retains that  
Even ‘short-term’ explanations may ultimately be embedded in ‘long-term’ 
trajectories such as the character of state formation. This adds considerable 
weight to the question of how the presence or absence of a near-monopolistic 
super-state shaped the preconditions for modern economic growth and levels 
of well-being. 
As mentioned above, a quite similar viewpoint is expressed by Diamond 
(1997). Asking why some populations such as Aborigines have not been capa-
ble of building, in various millennia, a complex society in areas where Europe-
ans, by contrast, reached this stage in few decades (2006 [1997], pp. 235-255), 
Diamond notes that Europeans, such as Asians, live in a large continent (Eura-
sia, including Nord-Africa) whose main axis is east-west oriented. Due to this 
orientation the communications and transfers (of information, technologies, 
people, animals and plants) are easier than in the case of orientation along the 
meridians, since it is not necessary to overcome frequent climatic barriers. 
Europeans arrived in Australia with a technology (and also with a population 
size) which was the outcome of an evolution occurring elsewhere, and not in 
Australia, where the very harsh environmental conditions had never allowed a 
hunter-gatherer population to evolve towards Modernity, simply because the 
technological and social gap was too big and therefore it was autonomously 
unbridgeable, in that area. 
Diamond’s approach is also gaining growing support from economists. Star-
ting from Diamond’s work, Olsson and Hibbs (2005) have built models which 
can estimate the per capita income for the three main economic systems adop-
ted by mankind (economy of hunter-gatherers, agricultural economy, the indus-
trial economy). The main conclusion reached by Olsson and Hibbs is that the 
current levels of economic development are positively correlated (at least for 
50%) to the initial bio-geographic conditions. The scholars have utilized five 
key variables: continent size, major axis of the continents, climate, number of 
animals that can be domesticated, number of plants that can be grown domesti-
cally. The main factors in the causal sequence identified are the size of the 
continents, their orientation and climate. These three factors directly influence 
the availability of plants and animals that can be domesticated, which in turn is 
the main cause of the time necessary to change a hunting and gathering eco-
nomy firstly into an agricultural economy and, then, into an industrial econ-
omy. 
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The latter factors (the availability of plants and animals that can be domesti-
cated), finally, together with the first three, are directly correlated to current 
income and development levels. The economic development of various regions 
of the world therefore seems to be directly influenced by the time that has 
passed since the agricultural and industrial revolutions (substantially by their 
technological “seniority”) and, both directly and indirectly (i.e. by this techno-
logical seniority), by the size, orientation and climate of the continents, which 
are then the remote causes of the development, but also, partially, the proxi-
mate (or direct) causes. The large size of a continent favours the constitution of 
numerous societies in competition with each other. The prevalently longitudi-
nal orientation (as in Eurasia), as we have seen, favours the transfer of persons, 
animals, plants, goods and information. It has been noted (Diamond, 2006 
[1997], p. 357, 360-361) that technological progress, also in modern compa-
nies, is favoured by a balanced mix of competition and information circulation 
(which can be regarded as a form of cooperation). Big companies, organized in 
highly hierarchical form, appear to be less efficient than others, equally large 
but with a less hierarchical organization, composed of relatively independent 
units which are competing with each other, but not enough to impede the flow 
of information. Another example of this type of economic and productive inter-
action is represented by industrial districts, where innovation, enterprise and 
territorial development are the result of the relations of competition and col-
laboration established between the different production units and between these 
and other spatial components (Marshall, 1919). Competitiveness thus seems 
positively correlated with the level of relatedness and this is due to the fact that 
the greater the relatedness, the greater and the faster is the exchange of infor-
mation between the production units. It should also be considered that the 
presence of a plurality of competing players, close enough to influence each 
other, increases the probability of success of the group as a whole because, as 
shown by the studies on technological innovation, when one of the competing 
players implements a more productive behaviour, this behaviour is quickly 
imitated by other actors. 
A similar situation seems to characterize states: in this regard it is usual, as 
mentioned above, to compare Europe, China and India (Diamond, 2006 [1997], 
pp. 357-358). The first, which has a very rugged territory, was almost always 
divided, but not enough to prevent the internal movement of information, peo-
ple and things, while the second was almost always united, due to the compact-
ness of its territory, with easy means of communication. India, finally, is the 
sub-continent which has known, with the exception of certain historical periods 
(essentially four, namely those of Maurja, Gupta, Mogul and English empires, 
the last of which of foreign origin) marked internal divisions. 
All three of these sub-continents reached considerable levels of civilization, 
but only the first was able to promote a process of economic, political and 
social development which reached a global dimension and progressively con-
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quered all other areas of the planet. Actually a similar process was happening 
in China in the fifteenth century, when its large fleet sailed the Indian Ocean, 
but a political upheaval, driven by a few individuals placed at the top of the 
institutions, was sufficient to cause the total abandonment of any expansionist 
policy and the withdrawal of that great country into itself (Diamond, 2006 
[1997], p. 318). If there had been more divisions and more internal competi-
tion, such a political upheaval could not have covered the whole country and 
maybe the political and economic geography of the earth would now be quite 
different. In Europe, instead, divided in the same period into various political-
territorial entities, large enough and financially able to support advanced re-
search and the development costs of new trade routes, but not so divided as to 
impede international trade – the control of which was the aim of much of the 
military competition – exploration opened up roads for the conquest of the 
world. 
Also the relation between institutions and geography, then, seems undeni-
able. Olsson and Hibbs too (2005) pose the problem of the influence of human 
institutions in determining economic development, and of the possibility that 
the same institutions can be influenced by geographic factors, showing a sig-
nificant correlation also in this case. 
The new hypothesis proposed by Diamond and substantiated by the research 
of Olsson and Hibbs seems to revive the argument of geographic determinism. 
Olsson and Hibbs, moreover, while highlighting the significance of political 
and institutional conditions in determining the developmental trajectories of a 
company, stress at the same time that these conditions are also influenced by 
the geographical factors described above. Influenced but not determined, be-
cause the interaction that links human and natural factors in a specific geo-
graphical space never takes a strictly deterministic connotation. As Diamond 
himself stresses, the anthropic factor – represented in this case by the political-
institutional conditions – can play such an important role as to greatly diversify 
the fates of societies found in very similar and even contiguous territories3. 
Human history, then, can play a role comparable in importance to that played 
by geographical factors, as already stressed by the historian Cipolla (1985, pp. 
137-142), when he talks about the importance of the so-called “reazione crea-
tiva della storia” (creative reaction of history). The interpretation furnished by 
Diamond can also be related to the pioneering thesis of Prigogine who, reflect-
ing on the evolutionary tendencies of humanity (1979, pp. 54-66), underlines 
that the social, cultural or economic evolution of a population is driven by 
essentially casual events (innovations), but whose effects are amplified or not 
                                                             
3  The author, for example, describing the great economic and social differences between the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti, two states which share the territory of Hispaniola, under-
lines that the events of Hispaniola are a real antidote against environmental determinism 
(2005 and 2007 [2005], p. 346). 
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amplified depending on the deterministic constrictions imposed by the existing 
structures. The author believes, in particular, that in some circumstances, and 
precisely when social systems are in a condition of instability, the evolution of 
these systems can be deeply influenced by the actions of single men or events. 
The phenomenon, and the risks connected to it, are effectively described by 
Buchanan (2008, p. 165), when he observes that it is interesting to reflect on 
the hierarchical organization of our societies, which place a few individuals in 
positions of great power. 
It should be stressed that, although in some moments even single men and/or 
events may change the course of history, much depends on the context and, 
more specifically, on the already mentioned political-institutional context. 
As discussed above, if the context consists of a single state, almost isolated, 
single events can be decisive, but if there is a set of interacting and interde-
pendent states, their effects can be absorbed or integrated by the system due to 
the dynamic that develops between the individual states. In other words, whilst 
not allowing forecasts for its individual components, the system of interacting 
states shows a greater predictability of its global evolutionary process. 
3. Mare Nostrum – Christian Europe: The Transmutation 
To understand the causes of the divergence between the European continent 
and China it is necessary to consider that between the Western Roman empire 
(convergent) and the medieval Christian area (divergent) there is a substantial 
political, economic and geographical difference. The great divergence begins in 
fact in the early Middle Ages, when the Western Mediterranean – having al-
ready declined at the economic level and been definitively ousted by Islamic 
expansion – died and was replaced by the “modern” Occident, which identifies 
itself in Christian Europe. Medieval Europe differs from the Roman world in 
many respects, while retaining some basic features. Among the differences we 
find the Christian faith, which however was already present in the Late Empire. 
The diffusion of this faith was in fact facilitated by the Roman roads, but in the 
Middle Ages it permeated ever the individual and social life of European popu-
lations ever more deeply. But it is mainly the transformation of what was the 
European part of the Roman world in a continental society, surrounded by sea 
rather than facing the sea and trading across it, that is the crucial element dis-
tinguishing the old from the new order. The sea no longer performs the role of 
decisive factor of territorial specialization in production, as in the Roman 
world, whose prosperity was due to sea trade. 
As illustrated above, the collapse of the “Mediterranean economic model” 
had already begun in the second half of the 2nd century, with the decline of 
Mediterranean trade. Western Europe, particularly, suffered a progressive 
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economic decline which weakened its capacity to resist invasion. This led to an 
increasing cost of restoration of capital, damaged by military events4, thus 
making many commercial activities uneconomic and pushing the economic 
system toward a de-specialization process, with lower and lower revenues. The 
society was reorganized in increasingly short-range economic activities and 
with the aim of territorial self-sufficiency. Slavery became a less and less fre-
quent state, with the complicity of the Christian faith. Christianity, though 
already dominant in the Late Empire, had not been able to suppress it (Paul of 
Tarsus spoke about the inevitability of servile labour) due to the resistance of 
the imperial economic structures. During the Middle Ages, however, the politi-
cal and economic conditions profoundly changed mainly because it became 
difficult to trade with ease across the Mediterranean5. In this period Europe 
became a source of slaves rather than a land where they are used. When there-
fore, due also to the pressure of various invaders, large sectors of the rural 
population settled in towns to defend themselves (Duby, 1992 [1973], pp. 148-
149), these populations shared one faith. The subsequent development, made 
possible by a series of climatic, political, cultural and economic factors – the 
most important of which was the gradual petering out of invasions from the 
10th and 11th centuries on, with the long period of relative peace that followed 
in Europe (Duby, 1992 [1973], pp. 143-154) – was not hampered by an eco-
nomic system with a predatory structure6: nothing could discourage the use of 
machines. 
In the past it has been argued that the Commercial Revolution derived from 
the clash between the bourgeoisie and the nobles. More recently, on the other 
hand, it has been argued that this revolution was the result of the interaction 
between the two classes7, while not forgetting that this period saw numerous 
and widespread riots and revolts – most frequently, however, where the power 
within the town was held by clerics – and that these events helped to strengthen 
the power of the emerging class. In this historical period, feudal aristocracy, 
merchants, artisans and peasants too were urbanized or lived around and in the 
town, sharing a unique conception of life: the pressure of the invaders set off a 
reaction triggered by the catalyst of the clergy, as well as Christian thought 
which, interacting with the ideal of returning to the glorious Roman past and 
the rediscovery of classical authors, would support a new culture, profoundly 
changed. 
                                                             
4  About the influence on economic equilibrium of the cost of war, see Paolilli, 2005a, 2005b. 
5  The western basin of the Mediterranean sea had been, as the Arab historian Ibn Khaldun 
admitted, almost at the mercy of raids by the Muslims who, with the conquest of Sicily, had 
also virtually separated it from the Greek-Byzantine area (Pirenne, 2000 [1937], p. 156). 
6  On the predatory character of many states of the pre-modern world, see Cameron (2005 
[2003]) and Keay (2001 [2000]), pp. 221-232. 
7  To this end see: Baschet (2005 [2004]). 
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4. The Development: An Interpretative Mathematical Model 
On the basis of the considerations made above, the dynamic interaction be-
tween economic and political systems in competition is one of the main factors 
that allowed medieval Europe to move towards Modernity, reaching a level of 
technological and organizational development which has assured to it a pro-
longed global supremacy. In the following pages we will try to develop an 
evolutionary model which simulates the competitive-collaborative interactions8 
between economic and political systems (henceforth: EPS) within a closed 
regional framework – i.e. characterized by no significant interactions with the 
outside world – with the purpose of analyzing the effects of long term impact 
on levels of development. 
The dynamic model we are presenting can also take the technological and 
socio-economic evolution into account. Even if we see economic development 
as a result – although it is also a cause in a circular and evolutionary interpreta-
tion of development – the model of innovative processes that concern the tech-
nological, social, political and cultural field in fact focuses on the effects of the 
competitive interaction between political-economic systems on technological 
progress and development levels. Here the simplification does not reduce the 
explanatory purpose of the model, since the interaction processes that occur in 
technology are not very different from those manifested in the political and 
social field. 
The economic and political systems could also be regarded as poles, because 
states, especially in the past, had a political and economic order characterized 
by an interaction model that tended to reinforce the dominance of the centre 
over the periphery by means of systematic drainage of resources produced by 
the periphery and their redeployment to the direct or indirect benefit of the 
centre. 
The fact that the poles are by definition concentrated in a point of space and 
have, with increasing distance, a decreasing influence, may make us think that 
the model we are presenting is more appropriate for describing interactions 
between cities than among states, which are more extended in space. This ob-
jection, however, is not relevant if we consider that generally, rather than a 
suppression of the surroundings EPS, we see a “diffusion” of the central or-
ganization over the territory, with the setting up of cooperative relations 
(though characterized by unequal exchanges) with the dominated EPS. In other 
words, rather than focusing on the poles in the strict sense of the term, our 
work focuses on the human organizations which, even if structured around an 
institutional (or economic) and geographic centre, can have a varying territorial 
size. The case of diffusion over a territory which was previously dominated by 
other organizations, as we will show below, can then be easily described by the 
                                                             
8  The interactions can be of a concurrence or collaborative kind. 
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model we are presenting, by increasing the value of the parameters that quan-
tify the degree of cooperation, or synergy, in the dominant organization (which 
has spread over the territory so as to constitute a larger system). 
Before tackling the problem of the relation between technological progress 
and economy, however, we must define the concept of “innovation”. Following 
the Schumpeterian approach to the issue of innovation (Schumpeter, 1911), we 
will distinguish type A innovations, which generate a significant and unpre-
dictable change, and type B innovations, which are predictable improvements 
in goods, productive organization and productive techniques. The first – which 
in addition to new goods and productive techniques, can also concern the or-
ganization of the society – can also modify the interpretative paradigms of 
reality, and their insurgence can be the result of chance, although they, like 
type B innovations, can sometimes be interpreted as the result of certain socio-
economic contexts. Being inherently revolutionary, however, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to predict their onset, it being possible only to estimate the 
receptivity to them of a given socio-economic system. 
Type B innovations, on the other hand, can easily be incorporated into an 
evolutionary model. Being of incremental nature, these innovations in fact tend 
to have an evolutionary trend that follows a specific technological trajectory 
and are therefore easily predictable in their temporal and geographical occur-
rence. 
In the following paragraphs we will present a mathematical model designed 
to study the conditions that can facilitate or impede the development of an EPS 
with particular attention to the effects of competitive-collaborative interaction 
with similar economic and political entities within the same geographical con-
text. The model is composed of as many differential equations as there are EPS 
interacting in a given geographical context. However, to make it easier to un-
derstand the description of the model we will apply it to two EPS only. The 
model will subsequently be enriched by taking the technological level as a 
variable too, though only as regards type B innovations. 
4.1 A Model of Interaction of EPS with a Given Technology: 
General Form 
Assuming that the growth of a given political-economic system depends not 
only on factors internal to the system itself, but also on dynamic interactions 
with similar systems within the geographical region – mainland area – to which 
it belongs and wanting to measure the effects of these interactions on the 
growth trajectory of this system and of those connected to it by this interaction, 
the interpretative model proposed here focuses on the study of these interac-
tions. The mathematical model considers two forms of interaction: a positive 
developmental impact of synergies that can arise between two or more territo-
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rial units, the other negative, represented by the constraint that the development 
of each entity represents for the others. 
The general form of the model which we present is therefore the following: 
 
 
where i = 1 … n (4.1.1) 
 
  
It describes the dynamics of n interacting EPS, each with an economic mass xi, 
and it is composed of n differential equations. The measurement unit of the 
economic mass can be identified in an economic actor. For the sake of simplic-
ity we will assume that all economic actors have the same dimension and char-
acteristics9. 
The variation coefficient of the mass i is ki, and the variation itself depends 
on the expression in square brackets, which measures the residual expansive 
potentialities of the EPS i. The summation in round brackets shows the coeffi-
cient of synergies induced by the presence of the masses xj (i.e. the synergies 
deriving from the internal relations of the EPS added to those induced by the 
relations with other EPS). We can assume in fact that the productivity of an 
organization is directly related to the synergies which, in turn, are directly 
related to the dimension of the same EPS or the EPS with which there are com-
plementary relations. The relation between the synergies and the economic 
mass is direct, but the growth of synergies cannot be unlimited; otherwise, in 
fact, the system would grow indefinitely. 
The summation in round brackets, which refers to the internal synergies of 
the organization added to those with other EPS, is therefore a set of homo-
graphic functions of the same synergies. The latter, therefore, grow in depend-
ence of the masses xj, tending to the values of the sij, which are their limit val-
ues, with decreasing increments. The Rij are form parameters of the 
homographic functions, where the 
ij
ij
R
s
 
measure the initial inclination of the same functions. The summation in round 
brackets therefore represents the global synergy coefficient which, multiplied 
by xiα i, measures the growth potential of the EPS i. We can recognize in this a 
particular kind of Cobb-Douglas production function, with a single production 
factor xi , multiplied by a coefficient here constituted by a sum of homographic 
functions and elevated at the exponent αi, whose value we assume to be less 
than one to describe a context in which the scale economies are decreasing (in 
the opposite case the growth of the EPS would be explosive). The particular 
                                                             
9  We could also identify the economic mass with the population, assuming an equal income 
for the individuals. 
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form of production function presented here is different from a common Cobb-
Douglas function not only in the presence of homographic functions which 
make the coefficient that multiplies the productive factor variable and in the 
fact that this factor is unique, but also because this coefficient, which in a 
common Cobb-Douglas is linked to the technological level, here measures only 
the effects of the synergies. The technological level, finally, is expressed by the 
exponent αi. These latter choices, however, are not new (see Paolilli, 2005a, 
2005b, 2008, 2009) and they enable the effects induced on the production by 
different but normally interrelated factors, to be clearly separated into synergies 
and technology. 
Lastly, the second summation measures that part of the potential growth 
which is already exploited by the interacting EPS. The coefficient tij measures 
the effect of the concurrence of an EPS j on the resources available for the EPS 
i. We assume that the value of tii (resources taken from the EPS i by its single 
operators) has a unitary value because we assume, for the sake of simplicity, 
that within an EPS the resources are equally accessible for all the operators of 
the EPS, and each of them takes from others exactly the resources which are 
necessary for the survival of a single operator. 
The effects of the distance between the EPS on their interactions, though the 
distance is not explicitly considered in the mathematical model, are implicitly 
expressed by means of the values of the coefficients tij and sij. In fact it is rea-
sonable to assume that both the synergic and the concurrence interactions be-
come less intense with the increased distance between the EPS, since both are 
hampered by growing costs of the transfer of raw materials, goods and services. 
Note that in the following graphic and numerical elaborations we will as-
sume, for the sake of simplicity and also for the purpose of studying a scenario 
in which the interaction happens between EPS that are as similar as possible, 
that the values of the concurrence coefficients t12 and t21 are equal. Also the 
form parameters R11, R22, R12 and R21 will be assumed to be equal. The equality 
between the latter and between the tij (with j ≠ i) will be maintained in all the 
simulations and therefore the form coefficients and the concurrence coeffi-
cients will be respectively indicated in all the figures with R and t. Also note 
that tii = 1; therefore this parameter will not be indicated. 
4.2 Case of Two EPS, With Technology as a Given 
Figure 4.2.1a shows a situation in which two EPS are so near to each other that 
they compete for the same resources (Figure 4.2.1b shows instead a detail of 
Figure 4.2.1a, near the origin of axes). The EPS also have a subsidiary relation: 
the values of the sij are positive, even if far lower than the sii. The positive panel 
is divided into zones marked by the letters A, B, C and D. Zone A covers all 
the values of x1 and x2 for which both the EPS grow. The zones B and C iden-
tify the values of x1 and x2 for which, respectively, only x1 or x2 grows, while in 
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zone D both x1 and x2 increase. There are the following equilibrium points: E0 
(origin of axes, with extinction of both the EPS), E1 and E2 (survival of only 
one EPS, respectively 1 or 2), E3 (survival of both). There are also points E4, E5 
and E6. The latter is very near to the origin of axes (survival of both the EPS 
with very low values: see Figure 4.3.1b). However they are points of unstable 
equilibrium: each perturbation, even if very slight, will push the system to-
wards a stable equilibrium point. 
In the equilibrium point E3 the mass of the single EPS is smaller of that of 
the surviving EPS in the equilibrium points E1 or E2, due to the low values of 
the sij, even if the global mass x1 + x2 is greater there. 
Figure 4.2.2, instead, shows an analogous situation, but with much higher 
values of sij (5 instead of 0.5). Also t is greater: 0.2 instead of 0.15 (the reason 
for this choice is in the need to make a comparison with the following figures). 
We can note that in the equilibrium point E3, with both the EPS vital, the mass 
of a single EPS is far bigger than the mass of the winning EPS in the equilib-
rium points E1 and E2. The coordinates of the equilibrium points E1 and E2 are 
however the same as the analogous points of Figure 4.2.1a, because in the 
absence of the other EPS the relative synergies and the effects of concurrence 
disappear (see in this respect 4.1.1). However, we cannot conclude that the 
survival of numerous EPS certainly generates a higher global output and 
greater prosperity. The actual expansion of the influence of an EPS, as men-
tioned above, does not necessarily generate the suppression of the rival EPS. 
For the purpose of more intensive land use, in fact, it is likely that the declining 
EPS is integrated in the system of expanding EPS, promoting its specialization 
and thus increasing its synergies with the latter10. This scenario can be de-
scribed by increasing the value of s11 or s22 (depending, respectively, on the 
prevalence of EPS 1 or 2). 
Figure 4.2.3 refers to a context in which one of the two EPS, (EPS 2), ac-
quires a technological advantage over the other. The value of 2 is in fact 0.62, 
while that of α1 is 0.6. Although the difference between α2 and α1 does not seem 
great, the consequences are significant: zone C grows at the expense of zone B, 
leading to the disappearance of the equilibrium point E3. It is therefore not 
possible for both the EPS to survive: in most cases the EPS which has the tech-
nological advantage will prevail. The opposite case, in fact, will happen only if 
the initial value of x1 is far higher than the initial value of x2 (residual zone B, 
near the x1 axis). An important consequence of this scenario is, however, that 
the total mass x1 + x2 will be considerably less than that reached, in case of 
equal technology, in the equilibrium point E3 of Figure 4.2.2. This is due, as 
already mentioned, to the disappearance of the synergies between the EPS: the 
                                                             
10  An historical example is provided by the story of Rome and Carthage. The later, a rival of 
the former, was destroyed by it, but after some time it was rebuilt because it was necessary 
for the exploitation by Rome of African resources. 
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surviving EPS must rely only on itself for exploiting the resources offered by 
the territory. Obviously also in this case we can note that the winning EPS can 
integrate the other one, for the purpose of better land use, thus increasing the 
value of its sii. 
Figure 4.2.4 illustrates a situation similar to that of Figure 4.2.3 (with α2 > 
α1), but with a lower value of t (0.1 instead of 0.2). This signifies that the con-
currence between the EPS is reduced, for example due to a greater distance, but 
without a fail of the synergies. The equilibrium point E3 appears again, and 
even the areas B and C adjacent to the axes, which involve the extinction of 
one of the two EPS (equilibriums E1 and E2), are very small. 
Figure 4.2.5 shows that the equilibrium point E3 can become unstable for 
sufficiently high values of t. The assigned values are the same as Figure 4.2.2, 
except for t, which is higher (0.25 instead of 0.2), describing a situation with 
more competition. The areas B and C reverse their position: if by chance the 
system is in E3, a slight perturbation is sufficient to push the system towards E1 
or E2. It is possible however that the system still converges to E3, if the xi have 
identical initial values (see Trajectory Tb, in Figure 4.2.5). 
There is an inverse relation between t and the values x1 and x2 of the point 
E3: if t increases, E3 approaches the origin of the axes, while areas B and C 
bordering it are progressively reduced and finally disappear, when the curves  
 
 
(with i = 1,2) 
 
 
have the same inclination and the equilibrium point E3 loses its stability. There 
is also (and above all) a trade-off between the value of t which makes the point 
E3 unstable as well as the technological level, measured by the αi: when the 
latter increases, in order for E3 to remain stable, t must decrease (Figure 4.2.6 
and Figure 4.2.7), and this happens because in an economic sense, technologi-
cal progress reduces the distance.  
It is very important to note that the examination of the figures presented 
does not furnish an incontrovertible answer about the final output of a bipolar 
system with given initial conditions. We could in fact believe that if the initial 
values of x1 and x2 are in zone A and E3 is stable, the system certainly will 
converge to E3, but this is not always true, because much depends on the in-
creasing speed of EPS 1 and 2. Even if the ki are equal, the growing speed is 
much influenced by the value of xi. If the initial position of the system, for 
example, is near to the border between zone A and the part of zone B near to 
the x1 axes (i.e. if x1 is far greater than x2), the increasing speed of EPS 2 will be 
far lower than that of EPS 1 (see in this regard the model 4.1.1), with the result 
that the system will be rapidly pushed to zone B which has E4 as its vertex, 
where only x1 will continue to grow, but only until the system enters zone D to 
converge on E1. This situation is briefly shown already in Figure 4.2.2 (trajec-
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tory at the bottom of the panel). Figure 4.2.8 shows instead a numerical simula-
tion of this situation, with an initial value of x1 (500) far higher than the initial 
value of the x2 (100). While the first grows rapidly, the latter show a very small 
initial increase, followed immediately by a fall (due to the passage of the sys-
tem into zone B). Later, due to the collapse of EPS 2, also the x1 fall, pushing 
the system towards E1. 
Finally, Figure 4.2.9 shows a similar situation, with the same initial values. 
The only different parameter is k2, which is much bigger than k1 (0.006 against 
0.001): the increase of EPS 2, due to the big growth coefficient, is so high that 
the system is prevented from surpassing the line  
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, going into the zone B and then converging on E3. 
Figure 4.2.1a 
 
The diagram shows the behaviour of EPS 1 and 2 in dependence of the values 
of x1 and x2, given certain values of the parameters. The values of the coeffi-
cients s12 and s21, which express the tendency to cooperate with the other EPS, 
are very low (0.5). In the equilibrium point E3 the mass of the single EPS is 
smaller than the mass of the winning EPS in the equilibrium points E1 and E2, 
even if the whole mass x1 + x2 is greater in these points. 
 359 
Figure 4.2.1b 
 
The diagram shows a detail of Figure 4.2.1a, showing that near the origin of 
axes there is an area D gravitating around the equilibrium point E0 (extinction 
of both EPS). 
Figure 4.2.2 
 
The graph shows a situation analogous to that presented in Figure 4.2.1a, ex-
cept for the values of s12 e s21, significantly higher (5 rather than 0.5). The equi-
librium point E3, in which both the EPS are vital, implies a mass of single EPS 
far bigger than in the equilibrium points E1 and E2. The coordinates of these 
equilibrium points are the same as the corresponding points in Figure 4.2.1a. 
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Figure 4.2.3 
 
The graph shows that, by varying the value of α2 a little (from 0.6 to 0.62), due 
to an innovation, the equilibrium point E3 disappears (because of the growth of 
area C). 
Figure 4.2.4 
 
The graph shows a situation like that of Figure 4.2.3 (with α2 > α1), but with t 
much less (0.1 instead of 0.2). The equilibrium point E3 is present here, and 
also the areas B and C next to the axes, leading to the extinction of one of the 
two organizations (equilibrium points E1 and E2), are very small. 
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Figure 4.2.5 
 
The values of the parameters, except the value of t which is considerably higher 
(0.25), are the same as Figure 4.2.2. The higher value of t causes the inversion 
of the position of the areas B and C near equilibrium point E3, which therefore 
becomes instable. Only trajectory Tb, with identical values of xi, can lead to E3. 
Points E4 and E5 disappear. 
Figure 4.2.6 
 
The graph shows that with technological progress (values of αi higher than 
those in Figure 4.2.2) equilibrium point E3 becomes instable. 
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Figure 4.2.7 
 
The values of the parameters are the same as Figure 4.2.6, changing only the 
value of t, which is lower. The graph shows that, increasing the values of αi, it 
is necessary to reduce t to conserve the stability of equilibrium point E3. 
Figure 4.2.8 
 
The numerical simulation presented in the diagram shows the evolution of two 
EPS starting from initial values placed in zone A (characterized by the growth 
of both the EPS). The initial value of x2 is however quite close to the B-South 
zone (see Figure 4.2.2) and therefore its initial growth is much slower than that 
of x1: the system moves into this zone and converges on the point E1 (extinction 
of EPS 2). 
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Figure 4.2.9 
 
 
The diagram shows the evolution of two EPS starting from the same initial 
values as Figure 4.2.8. The value of k2 is however much higher than the value 
of k1 (0.006 against 0.001). The system converges on the equilibrium point E3. 
4.3. A Model with Variable Technological Level 
We have up to now assumed the technological level as a given. We have said, 
however, that the innovations can be divided into two categories, type A inno-
vations, which are important and unpredictable changes, and type B innova-
tions, which are predictable improvements in the productive organization, 
production techniques and products. While it is difficult to predict the former, it 
is instead possible to incorporate the latter into a deterministic model, like the 
one we have presented above (4.1.1). In it, then, the αi can be assumed as vari-
ables, assigning them, in addition to an initial value, a potential value αiP, justi-
fied by a type A innovation. The evolution from the initial value to the poten-
tial value, by means of a flux of type B innovations, can be assumed as 
deterministic. It is opportune to consider, moreover, that the applications of the 
innovations tend not to be confined to one EPS: consequently the α of an EPS 
can be influenced, if not directly by the type A innovations of an EPS j, at least 
by those of type B (for imitation) and therefore, if not by the potential value αjP, 
at least by the effective value αj. Building the general model which describes 
the evolution of the αi, for the purpose of writing it in the most compact form, 
the potential value αiP will be named αj, with j = i. The model will then be the 
following:  
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for αj > αi 
 
 
 
   (4.3.1) 
 
where n indicates the number of EPS with αj > αi. 
αi therefore varies, according to a coefficient Kαi, in dependence of its own 
value (as for all growing entities, the already reached mass favours its further 
variation, either positive or negative) and depending on the summation of the 
differences between the potential values, represented by those values of the αj 
greater than αi , and the effective value αi. The fractional term 
 
jij
jijij
xR
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  measures, together with ik , 
 
the speed of the flow of innovations or information able to increase αi. It is 
reasonable in fact to assume that this speed is affected by the synergies, be-
cause they favour the circulation of ideas. The value of these synergies is mul-
tiplied for the concurrence coefficient tij11, because even if concurrence tends to 
impede the flux of ideas from the innovators, it can favour it due to the incen-
tive for the other operators to imitate the innovators. 
It is evident that in the (borderline) case in which the relations are only of a 
synergic or only of a concurrent type, the model will not measure the flow of 
ideas. We can see, however, that EPS which have no synergy or concurrence 
relations with a given organization can influence it by means of intermediate 
EPS. 
Examples are presented below in figures 4.3.1-4.3.3 of some numerical 
simulations showing the interaction between two EPS, with identical values of 
the coefficients of synergy and competition, in presence of type A innovations. 
In this case, too, the form coefficients and the competition coefficient will be 
identified only by R and t. 
Figure 4.3.1 shows the evolution of the two EPS, from equal initial values 
and the same parameter values, except αiP (0.62 in EPS 1 and 0.6 in EPS 2). We 
can see that EPS 2 collapses. 
Figure 4.3.2, similar to what we saw earlier (Figure 4.2.4), shows that it is 
sufficient to reduce the competition coefficient to permit the survival of both 
the EPS. 
Finally, Figure 4.3.3 shows how important the speed of adopting innova-
tions is. The values of the parameters and the initial conditions are the same as 
Figure 4.3.1, except for the coefficient of adoption speed, much greater in EPS 
                                                             
11  Remember that tii = 1, at least in the case of an internally homogeneous EPS. 
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2 (kα2 is 0.03, while kα1 is 0.01). As a result, unlike what we have seen in Figure 
4.3.1, EPS 2 does not collapse. 
Figure 4.3.1 
 
Organization 1 benefits from a more efficient innovation of type A: α1P > α2P. 
The EPS 2 collapses. 
Figure 4.3.2 
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The initial conditions and the values of parameters are the same as Figure 4.3.1, 
except for the competition coefficient t, which is less: both EPS develop and 
coexist. 
Figure 4.3.3 
 
Compared with Figure 4.3.1, only the value of variation coefficient Kα2 
changes (it is significantly higher). Organization 2, therefore, does not collapse. 
5. Conclusions 
One of the first conclusions that we reach by studying the model proposed in 
the previous section is that the process of economic interaction between EPS 
can lead to a reduction in the number of EPS and that the more intense the 
competition and the lower the propensity to cooperate and emulate, the greater 
this phenomenon is. At the same time the model also shows that the techno-
logical progress allows an EPS to increase its area of influence, reducing the 
economic and productive role of the EPS which can not readily adjust their 
technological level or do not implement strategies to diversify their production, 
specializing in the use of other resources. 
In the light of these results and taking into account the considerations in 
paragraphs 2 and 3, the model appears to provide an explanation of the differ-
ences between the developmental trajectories followed by the various Eurasian 
civilizations. Naturally it is only a theoretical model which, beyond the simpli-
fications mentioned above, takes into account only economic phenomena, 
therefore excluding political and military factors which may well be of funda-
mental importance in determining development processes on different geo-
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graphical scales (causing, for example, the prevalence of one EPS over another, 
perhaps economically stronger one). 
It should however be stressed that the aim of this contribution, beyond pro-
viding an interpretation of the divergence in the development trajectories of 
Eurasian civilizations, is also to show that among the factors determining this 
difference there is also a different configuration of the economic space. 
Regarding the western part of Eurasia, as already mentioned, it is necessary 
to note that between Roman world and early medieval Europe there is a fun-
damental difference. The former truly rose, as a power, with the duel between 
Rome and Carthage, which lay the foundation for the establishment of an em-
pire centred on the Mediterranean, in the double sense that this was its geo-
graphic centre – in which, furthermore, Rome had a central position – and the 
economic medium. Rome in fact would be fed with the wheat of Africa and its 
power, though already beginning to decline in the second half of the second 
century, would be destroyed only when the Vandals broke up this trade. 
This is an essential feature which will no longer be reproduced in the course 
of subsequent history. In Antiquity the Roman state, after the defeat of Car-
thage, had almost no rivals, at least in the western Mediterranean, and so could 
easily extend its domain in every direction. In later times, instead, once the 
Italy-North Africa axis was broken up, there would not be a single power in the 
centre of the Mediterranean that could unify it. Due to the Roman colonization 
too, which created the conditions for the existence of complex societies in 
Western Europe, Europe was to be divided into states in substantial balance, 
the largest of which would be positioned, moreover, in unusual positions in 
relation to the Mediterranean basin. 
The European world was born then as a set of territorial political entities, for 
which the sea was often a border, and even when it was a medium of trade it 
did not become the centre of the state, which maintained its core on the conti-
nent.  
It is no coincidence that the maritime republics, whose territorial dimension 
was very small if compared with that of other kingdoms bordering the Mediter-
ranean, operated successfully in trade because in the period of their ascent none 
of those kingdoms seemed to consider the sea anything more than a border and 
therefore wanted to extend their power over it. There would be an empire on 
the continent, but based on a very different production system from that of the 
Romans and also characterized by an extreme fragmentation of power. 
Europe, essentially, would continue to be formed by a set of competing 
powers, but in constant communication with each other, by means of a com-
mon cultural language and a convergent worldview. 
Due to the territoriality of their economies, these powers would remain es-
sentially in equilibrium, also because of the morphology of this continent. In 
fact the competition would be insufficient to eliminate all players, and this 
would happen above all because, due to the reduced shipping capacities, the 
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synergies within each EPS (sii), unlike what occurred in the ancient Roman 
world, which had at its geographic and economic centre the Mediterranean, 
would never be intense enough to increase the capacity growth of the single 
EPS until they could overwhelm the others. 
The various powers, with the advance of technology, due to the relative 
wealth of the territory, would expand without exceeding the natural barriers 
posed between one region and another. Even once the dominion of the sea was 
regained, ideas would circulate and competition would often be only economic, 
or it would be directed to the nascent colonial empires. Basically the scenario 
in Europe, once divided from the rest of the Mediterranean region due to politi-
cal and economic events and religious barriers, would evolve as a system rep-
resented by EPS with relatively low values of tij (con j ≠ i) and relatively high 
values of sij (with j ≠ i) and Kαi. 
The competition between the Chinese states during the period of fragmenta-
tion, instead, would be higher due to the scarce presence of geographical barri-
ers and because the Chinese territory is more compact and characterized by 
numerous navigable rivers to which a network of interconnected canals would 
be added. The presence of large rivers, moreover, will favour a political cen-
tralization which would not be aimed exclusively at predatory exploitation, as 
more likely occurs when the communication route was represented by sea, but 
also to the necessary coordination (represented by a relatively high value of 
internal synergies sii of the sole surviving EPS, synergies which would still 
permit a great production and, consequently, a large population). 
As regards India, we can distinguish in it at least two great areas: the plains 
of the Indus and the Ganges in the north and Deccan in the south. This second 
area, in particular, extends primarily from north to south and has coastal moun-
tain chains and other geographic barriers; it was rarely combined in a single 
political entity, and when that occurred, such entities generally originated in the 
Indus-Ganges region, more homogeneous and more easily viable. The Indus-
Ganges plain, furthermore, is bordered to the north-west with steppe areas 
which exposed it to easy invasions by warriors accustomed to the use of horse, 
little used in the Indian region, unsuited to its breeding (see Keay, 2001 
[2000]). India, like Western Europe and China, offered many resources for 
maintaining populous states. However, its heterogeneity and its geographical 
and climatic barriers, unlike China, hampered not only its unification, but also 
competition and, therefore, emulation (value of the Kαi), at least in comparison 
with Europe. 
Finally, as regards the large area of steppe and grasslands, we see in them 
the frequent formation of large state entities, though often not lasting and based 
on tribal foundations. These territories are not able to support large popula-
tions, but they can be easily crossed using horses, camels or dromedaries. 
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Scarce resources, inconsistent geographic and climatic barriers and the pres-
ence of fast means of locomotion suggest predatory economies, characterized 
by very high values of tij (with j ≠ i). 
Returning to Europe, we can note that it, once separated from the other terri-
tories around the Mediterranean, beyond presenting the characteristics men-
tioned (summarized by high values of Kαi and sij, and low values of tij) also 
showed two fundamental features: one, more deterministic, of a geographic 
kind, the other of a human type and, therefore, generating less predictable 
effects. The first was its not unbridgeable distance from America, a sparsely 
populated and still not technologically advanced continent, the second was an 
economy that gave everyone, if not wealth, then the opportunity to choose (at 
least from the time of the Crusades) the direction of his life. This possibility of 
choice, combined with a collective context permeated by a desire to recover an 
imperial greatness seen as the culmination of a destiny of evangelization of 
Europe, in a historical vision that was not cyclical as in the Ancient world, but 
linear, probably underlies not only Europe’s capacity to resist invasions and 
even to start expanding again, but also its progress towards Modernity. 
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